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Editor's Note: In Part One of this article, published in the last
issue, Professor Horowitz noted the rapid legal change taking place in
many parts of the world. Widespread Isl,amic law reform forms a
prominent part of the process of change. Professor Horowitz pointed
out that there is an inadequate supply of good theory to -explain the
sources and the directions of legal change, particularly theory that is
genuinely comparative, and he then provided a critical survey of the
main theoretical approaches that might be brought to bear on the
problem of change. Thereafter, Professor Horowitz laid out the contours of the extensive statutory changes that have taken place in Malaysian Islamic law, explaining that the Malaysian drafters had
borrowed freely, both from other Islamic systems and from Britishderived secular law, which has strong roots in Malaysia.
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In Part Two, Professor Horowitz shows the powerful influence of
common law methods on legal reasoning, on the reshaping of old Islamic law doctrines and the creation of wholly new obligations, and
on the legal process in general. He then reevaluates the predominant
approaches to legal change and makes the case for legal acculturation-a syncretic process by which the norms of one system infuse
those of another, without necessarily .undermining the latter's
authenticity.
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A COMMON LAw

OF SHARIAH

Proponents of Islamic reform in Malaysia have not been content
to move the law along by means of legislative enactment alone: case
law has also been a vehicle. Here the most visible evidence is heavily
in the appeal boards and committees of jurisdictions following the
Federal Territory model, two of them in particular. The decisions of
these appellate bodies are replete with secular methods of statutory
interpretation, applied even to sacred sources, with common law incrementalism, with holdings in the alternative, with distinctions
among prior cases and disavowals of earlier dicta, and with avoidance
of ultimate questions. The decisions often articulate new standards,
occasionally clashing with those of other jurisdictions. Like the statutes, the Islamic case law evidences convergence with the secular
law.
A.

Divorce and Polygamy: New Standards and Conflicts

Consider first a talak case, decided by the Selangor Appeal Committee in 1991. As we have seen in Part One,328 the statute prohibits
(indeed, it penalizes329) utterance of a talak out of court. Traditional
Shafi'i doctrine, however, finds extrajudicial talak to be completely
normal and effective for divorce. 33o In this case, Zainab binti
Mahmood and Abd. Latif bin JUSOh,331 there were no witnesses to
the extrajudicial talak, except the wife, who denied it had been uttered. Under customary Shafi'i doctrine, neither witnesses nor the
wife's presence would be required. Consequently, the kadi held the
repudiation to be effective. The appeal committee reversed, holding
that the statute provides the exclusive way to register a talak divorce
when the wife does not agree. 332 That is, application must be made
to the court, and the conciliation process must be followed. Moreover,
said the Selangor Committee, the Qur'an ~equires that a talak be witnessed by two adults of good character, failing which it is invalid. 333
The witnessing, the committee implied, must be done in the kadi's
court. Talak remains the husband's right in Islam, but it may not be
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.

Supra at 274.
Selan~:or Islamic Family Law Enactment 1984, No.4 of 1984, § 124.
Nawawi, supra n. 193, at 327-44.
Civil Appeal Case No. 16 of 1990 (Selangor App. Comm. 1991).
Id., slip op. at 4.
Id. at 6-7.
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uttered arbitrarily. Accordingly, concluded the committee, there is
no conflict between the statutory provision and the Qur'an~c ones. 334
Of course, it may be asked how talak can be 'the husband's right
if the statutory ground in which the right is now subsumed requires a
judicial finding of irretrievable breakdown. 335 And if talak may not
be uttered at the pleasure of the husband, why do the Shafi'i sources
recite innumerable ways to utter a repudiation, including: "Go back
to your family," "Go away," "Leave me alone," "Bid me good-bye," and
the singularly expressive "Your rope is on your withers"?336 To be
sure, the statute is clear enough in failing to countenance extrajudicial repudiation or, for that matter, repudiation even in court without
a finding of breakdown. But that merely makes the statute more
problematic in Islamic terms, and it cannot be doubted that a good
many kadis were....,-'-and are---registering divorces based on talaks uttered long before the parties got to court. The Zainab decision was
not popular among ulama. There is a clear doctrinal trend here, but
it is not uncontested ..
If Zainab was unpopular, Aishah bte. Abdul Rauf v. Wan Mohd.
Yusof bin Wan Othman,337 decided by the same appeal committee a
year earlier, produced a storm of protest in the Malay press. 33S Wan
Yusofwas a well-off businessman who applied for permission to take
as his second wife a Malay film star, Noor Kumalasari. Aishah, his
first wife, refused to concur and contested his application in the
kadi's court outside Kuala Lumpur. Noting Wan Yusof's financial
ability and finding him able to satisfy the emotional needs of both
women, the kadi granted permission. Aishah appealed, and the committee reversed.
On the question of financial ability, the appeal committeeaccepted the kadi's finding but cautioned ominously that in future applicants for polygamous marriages will need to provide documentary
evidence, including income tax records. 339 The committee then went
on to hold that Wan Yusof had failed to prove that the second mar334. Id. at 9.
335. Selangor Islamic Family Law Enactment 1984,.No. 4 of 1984, §§ 47-48.
336. Nawawi, supra n. 193, at 327·44 ..
337. [1990] 3 M.L.J. Ix (Selangor App. Comm. 1990).
338. For small portions of the debate, see A. Nazri Abdullah, "Undang-undang
Kekeluargaan Islam: Siapa yang Keliru? [Islamic Family Law: Who is Confused?],"
Berita Minggu, Aug. 5, 1990, at 10; Khalid Mohd., "Sejauh manakah undang2 boleh
halang poligami [How Far Can the Laws Change Polygamy?]," Mingguan Malaysia,
Aug. 5, 1990, at 9; "Polygamy not a right enshrined in the Quran," New Straits Times,
Aug. 20, 1990, at F·17. See also "Noorkumalasari Appeals to Trader's Wife," Star,
Aug. 4, 1990, at 3.
339. [1990] 3 M.L.J. at lxii. The reliance on documents for such purposes is not
customary in Islamic law. See generally J.A. Wakin,The Function of Documents in
Islamic Law (1972); Messick, "The Mufti, the Text and the World: LegalInterpreta·
tion in Yemen," 21 Man (n.s.) 102, 114 (1986).

1994]

ISLAMIC LAW REFORM

547

riage was "ju.st and necessary," as the statute requires. 340 His stated
inability to control his love for Noor Kumalasari would not make a
second marriage just. And, added the committee, the bare statement
by a husband that he intends to treat his first wife and existing children fairly does not make it so. At the very least, witnesses must
testify that the husband is a God-fearing and observant Muslim.341,
The committee turned finally, but briefly, to the religious validity
of the four polygamy conditions of the Selangor statute, which, as we
have just seen, go beyond conventIonal Shafi'i doctrine. The committee held that they are not in conflict with the Qur'an. The Qur'an
appears to permit up to four wives unless the husband fears that he
will "not be able to deal justly with them . . . ."342 The statute does
not aim "to abolish polygamy," said the committee, "but it merely provides constructive requirements in the hope that justice in the Muslim family may be better achieved. "343
Perhaps so, but, with an open-ended burden of proof about future
conduct placed on the husband, it is difficult to imagine tha~ many
applications for polygamous marriages will be approved if the first
wife objects. It is said that the Sultan of Selangor was concerned
about the legality of his own polygamous marriage after this decision,
and the four remaining conditions came under serious scrutiny.344
None of this was of more than passing concern to Wan Yusof. He
and Noor Kumalasari traveled to the east coast state of Trengganu,
there to be married by a kadi who did not inquire or did not care what
the Selangor Appeal Committee had done. 345
'
At the time of the marriage in Trengganu, that state's Family
Law Enactment simply r~quired, in general terms, the permissiori of
a Shariah court judge for a polygamous marriage. 346 The Selangor
standards, however, purport to apply to prospective polygamous husbands who are resident in Selangor, even if they are to be married
outside Selangor. 347 The Trengganu act provides that marriages are
generally to be solemnized in the mukim or area in which the bride
resides, unless the kadi or Registrar of Marriages allows solemniza340. Selangor Islamic Family Law Enactment 1984, No.4 of 1984, § 23(3).
341. [1990] 3 M.L.J. at lxiii.
342. Sura An-Nissa', quoted in id.
343. Id.
344. I am drawing here on an interview with a prominent Islamic jurist, Kuala
Lumpur, Apr. 27, 1992. The appeal committee was called in by the Sultan and asked
to explain the decision; and the state mufti was asked to examine the legality of the
four statutory conditions for polygamy. Id.
345. It is not uncommon for husbands refused permission to take a second wife to
leave the jurisdiction and marry her in another state or in southern Thailand. Raja
Rohana, supra n. 161, at 65.
346. Terengganu Administration ofIslamic Family Law Enactment 1985, No. 12 of
1985, § 21.
347. Selangor Islamic Family Law Enactment 1984, No.4 of 1984, § 23(2).
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tion to take place elsewhere. 348 If the woman resides in another
state, the appropriate authority in the other state must first give permission for the marriage,349 which manifestly Selangor did not do in
Noor Kumalasari's case. Under Trengganu law, in short, ifthe bride
had established Trengganu residence, all that would be required for
the polygamous marriage would be the permission' of the Trengganu
kadi. If she had not, the Selangor authorities would have had to be
consulted.
That is the law of Trengganu. But what about the law of Selangor? What effect does the Selangor provision giving extraterritorial
, application to its polygamy requirements have, when Selangor residents seek to be married outside the state? Suppose Aishah, the first
wife, had managed to object to the Trengganu marriage on the basis
of the refusal of permission in Selangor. Would the Trengganu kadi
have been legally obliged to recognize the Selangor refusal? If Noor
Kumalasari were not a Trengganu resident, as we have seen, the second marriage would clearly be foreclosed under the Trengganu statute. But if Noor Kumalasari were a Trengganu resident, the answer
is much less clear. The conventional answer in Islamic law is that
each kadi must decide for himself, and so the Trengganu kadi may
not have been obliged to recognize Selangor's refusal of permission,
based on Selangor's more restrictive standards for polygamy.
Why this is so may seem a bit mysterious. It may reflect a confusion of the absence of an Islamic doctrine of precedent with the absence of a doctrine of recognition of judgments. Malaysia's Islamic
system is superimposed on its federal system, and there is no doubt
that one kadi will recognize the marital status of a party married or
divorced in another jurisdiction. So, if no proceedings had taken
place in Selangor and Wan Yusof had been married to a second wife
in Trengganu on a showing insufficient to justify polygamy in Selangor, Selangor courts would still recognize the marriage. Even now,
they would presumably do so, though they refused permission before
the marriage, when the issue was open to them. 360 The usual conflict-of-Iaws principle is that a marriage valid where contracted will
be recognized elsewhere unless it is contrary to the fundamental pub348. Terengganu Administration ofIslamic Family Law Enactment 1985, No. 12 of
1985, § 18.
'
349. Id., § 18(3)(b). If the husband-to-be is resident in a state other than Terengganu, the appropriate authority in that state would merely have to attest to the truth
of the facts stated in the marriage application. Id.
'
350. Indeed, the marriage can now be registered in Selangor. See Selangor Islamic
Family Law Enactment 1984, No.4 of 1984 (as amended by Selangor Islamic Family
Law (Amendment) Enactment 1988, No.6 of 1988, § 5), § 23(1): "No man, during the
subsistence of a marriage shall, except with the prior permission in writing of the
Syar'iah Judge, contract another marriage, but and subject to Section 123 if he marries without such permission such marriage may be registered under this Enactment
on the order of the Court." Section 123 is the provision making polygamy without
permission an offense.
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lic policy of the state in which recognition is sought. 351 But the same
principle does not require recognition of one state's refusal to permit
marriage, based on standards more restrictive than those that prevail in the second state. 352 Selangor's attempt to restrict the behavior of its residents outside its borders will likely be ineffective if the
parties meet the requirements laid down by another state, as Wan
Yusof and Noor Kumalasari apparently did.
The potential for confusion and interstate conflict exemplified by
Aishah v.Wan Yusof suggests the urgent need to develop principles
of Islamic conflict of laws that thus far do not exist. A draft bill on
interstate enforcement of summonses, warrants, judgments, and orders of Shariah courts has been prepared for enactment. 353 It provides that a Shariah court order or judgment from one state may be
registered in the Shariah court of another; from that point on it will
be treated as if it had been issued by the receiving court. 354 By far
the most important problem to which such provisions are directed relates to the recurrent failure of husbands and former husbands to
comply with maintenance orders. On such problems, the act should
have a beneficial impact. But where two states follow different standards in their Shariah law, tl1e underlying conflict-of-Iaws problems
will not nec·essarily be resolved by interstate registration ofjudgments and orders alone. In cases like Aishah, the more permissive
state may not be bound by a decision of a more restrictive state if the
kadi finds the restrictive sta~dards to be in excess of what Hukum
Syara requires. For the most part, the rea~tion of reformers has been
to decry the variation rather than search for principles of recognition
and non-recognition of judgments in the light of Islamic rules about
the prerogative of kadis.
.
Occasionally, informal means are found to prevent inteIjurisdictional circumvention of judgments. In one Singapore case, a wife ignored a judicial decree of reconciliation obtained by her husband and
proceeded across the causeway to Johore to be married to a second
man, only t'o find the Singapore kadi close behind; On proof of the
351. See, e.g., In re May's Estate, 305 N.Y. 486, 114 N.E.2d 4 (1953).
352. Thus, restrictions on marriage to first cousins, very common in states of the
United States, do not bind those states that permit 'such mlil'liages. And marriages
between first cousins in the less restrictive states will be recognized as valid in the
couple's home state even if they went to the less restrictive state solely to take advantage onts more liberal marriage law and returned home immediately thereafter.
Schofield v.Schofield, 51 Pa. Super. 564 (1912). But compare id, at 570 (an expressed
personal incapllcity imposed by legislation will be respected regardless of where marriage is contracted) (dictum) with Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216 (1933). See
Russell J. Weintraub, Commentary on the Conflict of Laws § 5.lA (3d ed. 1986).
353. Sabah Syariah .Courts (Enforcement of Summonses, Warrants, Judgements
and Orders) Bill 1992, Legislative Assembly Bill No: 0 of 1992. Although the Sabah
version is cited, this unenacted bill is likely to be. enacted by t~e federal parliament
rather than a Iltate legislature.
354. Id., § 4(1).
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reconciliation, the Johore kadi annulled the second marriage he had
performed. 355 Such piecemeal methods do not satisfy the conflict-oflaw impulses of Malaysia's Islamic law reformers, who itch for a
means of securing uniform laws and uniform application of them.
Denial of permission for polygamy has not been uncommon in Selangor; it appears to be quite uncommon in Trengganu. As things now
stand, alternative models in famiiy law allow forum shopping.
A vexing problem under Shafi'i doctrine that is slowly being resolved by judicial decision is the matter of talak tiga (three talaks).
Only a talak thrice uttered is irrevocable; indeed, it terminates maintenance payments to the divorced wife and precludes remarriage to
her unless another consummated marriage intervenes. But what if a
husband utters three talaks at once? Nearly all the Arab countries
and most other Islamic jurisdictions provide that a simultaneous
triple talak counts only as one and so is revocable. 356 The Shafi'i
school, however, counts it as three,357 much to the chagrin ofIslamic·
reformers among the Shafi'i Malays.
Slowly, judicial decisions seem to be eroding the firmness of this
rule. Where the husband was found to belong to the Hanafi school,
presumably because he was an Indian Muslim, three talaks were
held to equal one. 358 Where a husband had previously uttered one
talak and then simultaneously uttered two more, the Federal Territory Appeal Board reversed a kadi's determination of irrevocable divorce and found as a matter of fact that the husband had only meant
to utter the second talak. 359 Where the husband could not recall the
date of the alleged talak tiga, and the wife denied he had uttered it,
th~ same appeal board, expressing obvious displeasure with the ease
with which the kadi had confirmed the irrevocable divorce, remanded
the case for a hearing. ~60 The wife's denial puts the burden of proof
355. Djamour, supra n. 126, at 127-28.
356. Anderson, supra n. 209, at 227; Siraj, supra n. 276, at 229.
357. Ahmad Ibrahim, supra n. 248, at xv (overview of talak tiga issue in Shafi'i
thought).
358. Re Mohd. Hussin bin Abdul Ghani & Anor, [1990] 2 M.L.J. lxxv (Fed. Terr.
Syariah App. Bd. 1990). The board applied Hanafi doctrine because of the identity of
the parties. See infra n. 364.
. "
359. Jasni bin Adbul Rahim v. Rahmah" bte. Mohd. Jono, [1992] 1 M.L.J. cxliii
(Fed. Terr. Syariah App. Bd. 1991). The Board applied Hanafi doctrine because of the
identity of the parties. See infra n. 364.
360. Rojmah bte. Adbul Kadir v. Mohsin bin Ahmad, [1991] 3 M.L.J. xxx (Fed.
Terr. App. Bd. 1991). The board's hostility to the simultaneous triple talak is transparent. It stated flatly that "a person who wishes to divorce his wife should pronounce one talaq at a time," id. at xxxii. Upon pronouncement of irrevocable divorce,
the husband is generally liable to pay the balance of the bride price as well as a consolatory gift and the wife's share of jointly-held property. One payment to which the
wife is not entitled if the divorce is irrevocable is maintenance during the eddah period, which lasts for 100 days after the pronouncement of a talak. This is likely an
additional reason for the reluctance of appeal boards to confirm divorce in talak tiga
cases.
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on the husband, who must produce witnesses. 36l Noting that the act
provides only for talak in court, the board went on to point out that
talaks are pronounced in court only one at a time. 362 If that is soand it surely is-then the talak tiga problem dissolves. Extrajudicial
talaks are invalid, and so are multiple, simultaneous talaks. Rather
than go this route, however, the board simply determined that a kadi
must take great care in evaluating a pronouncement of three talaks.
Had the Federal Territory Appeal Board taken the logic of the
Selangor Appeal Committee in Zainab to the next step and ~eter
mined that, Bince extrajudicial talaks are invalid, there can nev~r be
three talaks at once, a6a the dissonance with Malaysian Islam would
have been enormous. This reading of the statute, however, would
have been wlassailable.
By the same token, the Federal Territory model implicitly provides for recourse for· some purposes to any of the Sunni schools, a64
and we have. seen that the statute itself borrows from other
schools. a6G So in principle the board could have chosen the nonShafi'i rule that three talaks simultaneously pronounced amount
only to one. This it has never done unless the husband belongs to
another school. It has justified this practice by reference to a leaciing
Shafi'i text that makes t}:le choice of school turn on the husband's affiliation. a66 Yet this is a Shafi'i choice oflaw rule that the statute
neither requires nor forbids. Anc~ so, for the time being, decisions are
burdened with what may seem. to be logical inc~nsistencies. But
talak tiga is having a hard~r imd harder time in court.a67 By a common law process, it is being whittled away.
361. Id. at xxxii.
362. Id. at xxxi. The board pointedly asked "whether any action had been taken"
against the hunband for Violating the act by pronouncing talak out of court. Id. at
xxxii.
.
363. Zainab 'V. Abd. Latif, supra n. 331, slip op. at 4-5. The statute never speaks of
simultaneously pronouncing three talaks; in-court talaks are pronounced !,ingly. See,
e.g., Islamic Family Law (Federal Territory) Act 1984, Act 303, 1984, §§ 47(3), 47(14),
48(5). Twice the Federal Territory Appeal Board has come close, saying that there
seems to be nothing in the statute allowing for registration of divorces pronounced
outside of court, Re Mohd, Hussin, supra n. 358, at lxxv; Rojmah, supra n. 360, at
xxxi, but in each case it has decided the matter on other grounds.
364. Islamic Family Law (Federal Territory) Act 1984, Act 303, 1984, § 2(1):
" 'Hukum Syara' means the laws of Islam in any recognized sects ...." This broad
definition is not necessarily a blanket authorization to choose rules freely from among
the various schools, for the term Hukum Syara' appears at various specific points in
the statute and requires definition in those contexts: See, e.g., id., §§ 52(1)(l) (fasakh
grounds), 60 (liability for maintenance). But it was pursuant to section 2(1) that the
board in Re Mohd. Hussin, supra n. 358, at lxxvi, stated it was "justified" in looking to
Hanafi rules, thus implying that section 2(1) might provide fairly wide-ranging authorization for the choice of any appropriate rule in the course of litigation.
365. See supra at 269,281-82,287.
366. Re Mohd. Hussin, supra n. 358, quoting Nawawi, supra n. 193, at 337-38.
367. In addition to the cases discussed, see Mohaygen A. Naing, supra n. 160, at
142-43.
.
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In all of these cases, and inevitably in all statutory formulations
of revealed law, there is dual-track reasoning. The statute is interpreted, and then it is demonstrated that the statute, so interpreted,
accords with the proper Islamic view of the matter. (Or, in the Federal Territory talak tiga case, the appeal board concedes that, since
the statute does not provide for extrajudicial talak, initial "recourse
must be had to the [nonstatutory] sources of Islamic law."368 Either
way, there is in principle no power to vary Islamic law.) It is hardly
surprising that the statute, which is drafted to read like any statute
in the secular law, will be interpreted by methods familiar to Malaysia's common law judges. What is less evident until one focuses on it
is that the Islamic sources are interpreted bY,the very same methods.
An excellent example is provided by the judgment of the appeal
committee in Aishah v. Wcin Yusof,369 the polygamy case. There is a
verse in the Qur'an that reads "If you fear that you shall not be able
to deal justly with orphans, marry women of your choice-two, three,
or four. But if you fear that you shall not be able to deal justly with
them, then marry one. That will be more suitable to prevent you
from doing injustice. "370 This is the verse widely thought to authorize polygamy on a liberal basis. In dealing with it, the committee
noted that "the first limb" of the passage is permissive, the second
prohibitive. 371 It then proceeded to say that both limbs must coexist,
and since the statute does not abolish polygamy but purports merely
to insure justice to wives, it is not incompatible with the restrictive .
verse. 372
Wan Yusofhad also contended, and the kadi had agreed, that a
good reason for granting permission for the second marriage was that
otherwise the sin of adultery might result. Construing the statute,
the appeal committee held that this could not justify the permission.
Wan Yusof must be "in control of his desires and be able to restrain
himselffrom committing adultery and other sinful deeds,"373 particularly inasmuch as "Aishah has no physical defects and has adequate
sexual feelings and has never objected to sexual relations. "374 But
then the committee had to confront the kadi's Islamic grounds for
368. Re Mohd. Hussin, supra n. 358, at lxxv. The board also notes that the statute
makes it an offense to pronounce extrlijudicial talak-which it concedes is allowed in
Islam-but states that the offense "appears to be ignored so far by the Syariah
Court." Id. To complete the paradox, the board hints in Rojmah, supra n. 360, at
xxxii, that on remand the kadi's court ought to think about punishing the husband for
the offense of pronouncing talak out of court. All of this while still enforcing-reluctantly-extrlijudicial talak.
369. Supra n. 337.
370. Quoted in id. at lxiii.
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. Id. at lxii.
374. Id. at lxiii.
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permission, which depend on a hadith (an authoritative saying of the
Prophet). Here is how the committee dealt with the problem:
The learned judge relies on the legal ruling which states
that a person is obliged to marry if he is able to fulfil the
sexual needs of the wife and he fears that he will be drawn to
commit zina [the sin of fornication] or some wrong and he is
also able to provide maintenance for the wife. In our opinion
this ruling is addressed specifically to young men who are
unmarried, and it is based on the hadith as told by Abdullah
bin Masod, which is to the effect: .
Oh young people whoever among you is able to
marry should marry for it keeps you from looking at
strange women and preserves from unlawful intercourse. (Sunan Abu Dawud Kitab Al Nikah Vol 2 p.
544).
.
If the unmarried young men are capable of doing so, that is
both physically and materially, they should marry because if
they do not so they may be tempted to commit zina or sinful
act[s]. Therefore, the hadith relied upon by the learned
judge of the Syariah Court is wholly irrelevant on the facts of
the present case. 375 .
In short, concluded the appeal committee, the hadith applies only to
first marrial~es.
The committee gave the hadith the same treatment it might
have given to a prior decision: it distinguished it. The judgment
manifests the usual common law antipathy to deduction and abstract
principles, and its affinity for context or what Karl N. Llewellyn
called "situation sense. "376 The technique of the appeal committee
raises no eyebrows in the common law world, but it is not the usual
Islamic exegesis, which, many commentators have pointed out, is unusually deductive and, when creative, mainly analogical. 377
Two more recent Selangor cases are even more thoroughly suffused with common law method. In Fakhariah bte. Lokman v. Johari
bin Zakaria,378 a husband and wife had remarried after their first
divorce. The husband had duly executed a taklik, a statement promising that if he failed to maintain the wife for four months, "according
to the custom, "379 the wife could secure a divorce. After a quarrel, the
375. Id. at lxiii.
376. The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals passim (1960).
377. For depictions of classical Islamic legal reasoning, see Wael B. Hallaq, "Legal
Reasoning in Islamic Law and the Common Law: Logic and Method," 34 Clev. St. L.
Rev. 79 (1985·86); Messick, supra n. 339, at 112-16; Rosen, "Islamic 'Case Law' and
the Logic of Consequence," in History and Power in the Study of Law, supra n. 23, at
302-19.
378. [1993] 1 M.L.J. lxxvii (Selangor Syariah App. Bd. 1992).
379. Id. at lxxviii.
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wife left the marital home and thereafter received no maintenance. A
year and a half later, she sued for divorce based on the taklik. Following standard doctrine, the kadi held that the wife's right to maintenance was conditioned on her obedience. When she left home
without her husband's permission, she exhibited recalcitrance
(nusyuz), which precluded maintenance and the award of a divorce
based on a failure to provide it. Reversing the kadi and neglecting
the language in the taklik about "custom," the Selangor Appeal
Board decided that, as the taklik was framed in unconditional terms,
recalcitrance is no defense. In any case, said the board, if there is a
doubt about the terms of a taklik, the document should be construed
against the husband. 3Bo If the importation of this common lawprinciple of construction were not enough, the board went on to distinguish an earlier case in which a kadi had held that a taklik that is
silent on the wife's duty of obedience cannot override that duty,
which derives from divine law. 38l In that case, the kadi had found
the wife to have been obedient, and so the point was not squarely
decided. But even if it were, concluded the appeal board in an explicitly' alternative holding, Fakhariah's husband had never obtained a
judicial order of recalcitrance against her and so is disabled from
raising the matter as a defense to the divorce action. 382
ThePakhariah judgment was written by Tan Sri Haji Mohamed
Azmi, a secular court judge who also delivered the judgment in Noryati bte. Tasrip v. Ha'mid bin ehe Mat,383 iIi which a husband 'had,
sued to confirm an order of marital reconciliation (rujuk). To be effective to revoke a divorce, such a reconciliation would have to have
been accomplished within the lOO-day eddah period during which
certain divorces are still revocable. Hamid, however, had stated two
different dates in his documentation, one of them beyond the eddah
period. Accordingly, the Registrar of Muslim Marriages had deciined;
to register the rujuk, whereupon Hamid managed to persuade the'
kadi's court to declare the rujuk valid. On appeal, the kadi was re- .
versed. Where the wife denies that rujuk took place within the appropriate period, the burden falls on the husband, to produce two
witnesses to the rujuk. No such witnesses were produced, and the
rujuk is thus not registrable. An earlier case 384 was distinguished on
the ground that there the wife did not contest the validity' of the
rujuk, rendering earlier statements of the board dispensing with the
380. Id. at lxxix.
381. Aisny bte. Mohamed Davis v. Haji Fahro Rozi bin Mohdi, [1990] 2 M.L.J. xXvi
(Fed. Terr. Syariah App. Comm. 1989).
'
382. Fakhariah, supra n. 378, at lxxix~lx. '
383. [1993] 1 M.L.J. cxxxiX (Selangor Syariah App. Bd. 1992).
384. Siti Hawa bte. Mohamed v. Mohamed Redzuan, [1992] 1 M.L.J. cxcix (Selangor Syariah App. Bd. 1990).
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need for witnesses obiter-fortunately so, since the Qur'an provides
that witnesses are needed. 385
Qur'anic interpretation is here mixed with common law doctrine
and method. The interpretation of documents, the use and avoidance
of precedent, the resort to alternative holdings, the invocation of burden of proof: all proceed according to common law practice, which
shapes the outcome. In Fakhariah, the wife's production of male and
female witnesses is held to be sufficient on a plain reading of the statute. In Noryati, the husband's failure to produce any witnesses
defeats his case, on burden of proof grounds. In the former, the effect
of eliminating a recalcitrance defense to-a taklik divorce is to put Selangor in conflict with other states and to weaken the wife's traditional duty to obey her husband, a duty which has long made it
legally perilous for a wife to leave an unhappy marital home. 38G In
the latter case, the effect might be.to spread the seeds of an emerging
doctrine that no reconciliation will be held effective merely because
the husband unilaterally pronounces it. 387 The core substantive doctrines expounded by common law method are thoroughly Islamic in
origin, but it is a decidedly progressive, reshaped version that
emerges from the hand of the judges.
Beginning in the nineteenth century, as we have seen, Islamic
law has been subjected to the mercies of common law judges, at first
~ritish and now Malay. The incremental movement to a new law is
methodologically familiar, even when the Islamic sources are not.
The Shariah in Malaysia is thus doubly affected by the common law.
In the first place, it is surrounded by a much larger body of Britishderived secular principles, some of which, insofar as they apply to
non-Muslims, cover the same fields as those which apply to Muslims.
This is the case with family law. There has been a discernible tendency to reduce the dissonance between the two bodies oflaw, both by
legislation and by judicial decision. In the second place, the galloping
codification of Islamic law beginning in the 1980s has placed a large
385. Noryati, supra n. 383, at cxli-cxlii.
386. In some states, nusyuz is a common defense to a taklik action. Sharifah
Zaleha, supra n. 241, at 192-93; Sharifah Zaleha, supra n. 195, at 6-7, 11.
387. The appeal board in Noryati, supra n. 382, at cxliii, stated that "[i]n any case,
as the wife has not consented to the ruju', the court has no authority to order the
registrar to register it." What the board seemed to be referring to is the requirement,
in the Federal rrerritory and Kelantan models, that a wife may not be ordered to resume relations after a rujuk to which she has not consented. Islamic Family Law
(Federal Territory) Act 1984, Act 303, 1984, § 51(9); Kelantan Islamic Family Law
Enactment 1983, No.1 of 1983, § 39(4)(b). Under these sections, her failure to consent triggers appointment of the same sort of conciliatory committee appointed in
cases of divorce by reason of irretrievable breakdown. If the conciliatory proceedings
lead to stalemate, the arbitrators appointed may ultimately 4;lffect a divorce. By implication, then, for a rujuk to be valid a wife must consent. With the abolition of unilateral pronouncements of divorce, it stands to reason that unilateral pronouncements of
reconciliation will come under scrutiny. In various ways, the family law enactments
penalize unilateral rujuk. See supra n. 216.
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number of relatively more specific statutory provisions before the Islamic courts for interpretation. It stands to reason that, in interpreting statutes and Islamic sources simultaneously, the same
interpretive method might be applied to both-which is exactly what
has happened, at least in some appeal committees. In the end, this
common law transformation may be the latent meaning of "upgrad'
ing" the 8hariah courts.

B. Marital Property and Consolatory Gilts: Changing Law,
Changing System
Upon divorce, a Muslim woman in Malaysia is entitled to several
forms of payment. 388 These include any unpaid portion of the mas
kahwin or dowry and other gifts promised to the wife at the time of
marriage, full payment of which is often deferred; maintenance and
accommodation for the period of 100 days following a revocable divorce, at which point it becomes irrevocable and the wife receives no
further maintenance; the wife's share of the harta sepencarian or
joiritly ~cquired marital property; and mutfJ,'ah, a required consolatory gift payable to a wife who has been divorced without fault.
If the divorce is by mutual consent, the parties may agree on the
amounts due. 80metim~s, to induce. ~onsent, the wife waives payment of some or all of these obligations. In practice, whether by
agreement or default, the husband often pays little or no maintenance or muta'ah. In a large urban survey from the 1970s, more than
a third paid no maintenance, and 90 percent paid no muta'ah. 389
When it was paid, muta'ah formerly consisted of only a' token
amount, perhaps as low as M$1O (approximately U.8.$4) and rarely
more than M$100.390 These practices, however, are beginning to
change, as kadis and lawyers become more diligent about enforce~
ment and as the legal obligations themselves expand.
The formal outlines of the obligations appear timeless, but their
scope and content have been growing. This is particularly true. of
harta sepencarian and of qluta'ah. The role of economic change, of
the 8hariah bar, of judges, and of statutes and practices (both Islamic
and secular) in bringing about the reconfiguration oflegal obligations
provides important clues to the various combinations of elements
that produce systemic legal change.
388. For a survey, see Supiah Meon, "Financial Provisions: Maintenance and
Property-The Law Applicable to Muslims," in Women and the Law, supra n. 210, at
24-36. See also Abdul'Kadir bin Yusof, "Women and the Law," [1975] 2 M.L.J. xxi
(before the family law enactments codified the obligations); Ahmad Ibrahim, supra n.
248, at xvi-xvii (Singapore law, which is generally similar).
389. Azizah, supra n. 243, at 99-101, 102-03.
390. See id. at 103; Djamour, supra n. 126, at 111, 162 (Singapore practice from
1960s); Ahmad Ibrahim, supra n. 248, at xvii (same).
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1. Marital Property: Merging and Emerging Law

Harta seJPencarian is an institution of marital property. The historical core of the institution holds that property (usually land) acquired or improved during marriage by means of the Joint resources
or joint labor of husband and wife belongs to both of them and will be
divided into Bhares upon divorce or death. 391 The woman's share in
such property, titled in her husband's name, has been variable over
time and place, but generally it has been put at one-half, one-third, or
a fraction dir,ectly proportionate to her contribution. 392 Although frequently confused with the Islamic concept of harta sharikat or partnership,393 harta sepencarian derives instead from pre-Islamic Malay
adat or custom. 394 It'may have roots in the matrilineal society of
Negeri Sembilan,395 aspects of which have affected custom in other
states,396 although similar marital property rules can be found
among non-matrilineal Muslim groups elsewhere in Southeast Asia.
The doctrine of harta sepencarian has the potential, at several
points, to conflict with Islamic rules. 397 The Sunni law of intestate
succession, in effect in Malaysia, allocates, to a widow a one-eighth
share if there are surviving children, one,.quarterifnot. 398 The maximum share is less than what the wife will probably receive on harta
sepencarian property at her husband's death. 399 If this conflict is
usually averted, that is only because amica,ble agreement among rel~
atives accords the widow a share larger than Islamic law does. 40o
391. See Hj. Salleh bin Hj. Buang, New Frontiers in Harta Sepencarian 5-9 (1988).
Sometimes joint efforts were not required. Id. at 10-12.
392. Id. at 17, 21, 38-39, 41.
393. Id. at 10, 44; Hooker, supra n. 107, at 240-48.
,394. Zainoon v. Mohamed Zain, [1981] 2 M.L.J. 111 (Singapore Shariah App. Bd.
1978); Abdul Msjid Nabi Baksh, Muslim Divorce: Ancillary Orders 34-37 (unpublished manuscript, n.d., ca. 1992).
395. Ahmad Ibrahim, "The Muslims in Malaysia and Singapore: The Law of Marital Property," in Family Law in Asia and Africa, supra n. 209, at 195 (reporting that
the rule beiongsl to the matrilineal adat).
396. Taylor, !Iupra n. 106, at 8-9 (noting that traces of matrilineal adat were visible
in south Perak property distributions).
397. Many authorities state that Islam recognizes only separate property, even
during marriage. See Mustafa O. Abubaker, Properly Rights DUring Marriage and
Divorce 91 (1980); M.B. Hooker, The Personal Laws of Malaysia 21 (1976); David
Pearl, A Textbook on Muslim Personal Law 75 (2d ed. 1987).
398. Susan M. Redick, Islamic Law of Succession and Its Application in Malaysia
and Singapore 17 (unpublished paper, Duke Law Sc~ool, Spring 1993).
399. Under Sunni rules enforced in Malaysia, a male spouse also inherits twice
what a female spouse inherits, Abdul Kadir, supra n. 388, at xxv, whereas harta
sepencarian often provides for equal division of marital property on the death of
either. Once the harta sepencarian share has been severed, the spouse is also eligible
to inherit the appropriate share of the remaining estate. See Mehrun Siraj, supra n.
126, at 45. In practice, however, it remains an open question how frequently such
double division occurs. See infra n. 400 and accompanying text.
400. Ahmad Ibrahim, Family Law in Malaysia and Singapore 294-95 (2d ed. 1984)
("The fact that the Muslim law allows distribution of the estate of a deceased person
to be settled by consent of the heirs has enabled many arrangements which are in
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Of course, a conflict between Islamic law and harta sepencarian
depends on a prior finding that the wife's share is actually part of the
husband's estate-which, however, is the very thing in issue-and
there are ways to conclude that it is not. One way is to treat the
wife's share as a debt to be deducted from the estate before it is subject to distribution. 401 Such treatments become more difficult as the
concept of marital property expands. Some cases hold that the wife's
entitlement may accrue wholly as the result of doing housework
while the husband acquired property in his name out of his own resources402 or as the result of simply accompanying the husband on
business tripS.403 Neither of these activities would give the wife any
property interest under Islamic law. 404
Despite such conundrums, harta sepencarian has survived and
expanded. The property concerned is not restricted· to land but extends to movable property-in one case, boats and fishing nets. 405 As
recently as the 1970s, it was plausible to think that in some states a
claim to a share of marital property had to rest on equal capital or
labor in its acquisition. 406 Although shares are still variable by state
and somewhat unpredictable by court, an equal contribution of labor
or capital is generally not required to obtain a share. As already
noted, housework that leaves a husband free to acquire property may
be sufficient,407 and so is a wife's "constant companionship [that] was
responsible for the [husband's] peace of mind which enabled him to
function effectively as a businessman. "408 To be sure, a direct contrireality 'application of the adat kampong [village custom] to pass as distributions according to Islamic law."); Taylor, supra n. 106, at 10 ("The fact that the Muhammadan
law allows distribution of the estates of deceased persons to be settled by consent of
the heirs has enabled many arrangements which were in reality application of kampong custom to pass as distributions according to Muhammadan law ...."). In litigation, the problem is not so easily solved. See Ahmad Ibrahim, supra n. 395, at 195-96
(discussing cases in which Quranic distributions superseded harta sepencarian and
vice versa).
401. Hj. Salleh, supra n. 391, at 33-34.
402. Rokiah bte. Haji Abdul Jalil v. Mohamed Idris bin Shamsudin, [1989] 3 M.L.J.
ix (Fed. Terr. App. Bd. 1989).
403. Boto' binti Taha v. Jaafar bin Muhamed, [1985] 2 M.L.J. 98 (High Ct. 1983).
404. Cf. Mannan, supra n. 168, at 59 (presumption that cash and household furniture belong to husband); Takuma Abe, A Comparative Study of Islamic Ownership
34-37 (Institute of Middle Eastern Studies, International University of Japan, Working Paper No. 10, 1987) (labor as basis of ownership); Ahmed H. Al-Maamiry, Economics in Islam 54-57, 83 (1987) (various methods of acquiring ownership);
Muhammad Muslehuddin, Economics and Islam 99 (1974) (same); Anwar Ahmad
Qadri, Islamic Jurisprudence in the Modern World 171-80 (1963) (same); Joseph
Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law 136-38 (1964) (same).
405. Boto', supra n. 403.
406. See Ahmad Ibrahim, Islamic Law in Kelantan-197B, [1980] 2 M.L.J. xxxiii,
xxxiv (remarking that this is a difficult standard). See also Ahmad Ibrahim, Family
Law in Malaysia and Singapore 253· (2d ed. 1984) (recounting older cases in which
.
household work entitles wife to no share).
407. Rokiah, supra n. 402.
408.. Boto', supra n. 403, at 100.
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bution, such as cultivation ofland, would generally entitle a wife to a
larger share, typically one-half, but if the wife contributes "indirectly"
(as in the case of business trips), she might receive a one-third share;
indeed, she is "automatically entitled" to it.409
However dubious as a matter of Islamic law, the intangible contribution as a basis for a share is now well established. In Mansjur
bin Abdul Rahman v. Kamariah bte. Noordin,410 a divorced wife
sought a share in property her husband had been able to acquire only
because she was a citizen, which he was not. Referring to the Islamic
principle of musha, which mandates the equal division of separately
owned property that has become commingled, the Federal Territory
Appeal Board, concerned to ground harta sepencarian in Islamic
law,411 remarked that "it seems justifiable to extend the principle to
cases of claims to harla sepencarian. "412 Partly because the property
could only have been obtained because of the wife's citizenship, the
board confirmed the kadi's award of a half share to her in Mansjur.
Even social position can constitute a contribution. In Tengku Anun
Zaharah v. I,>ato'Dr. Hussein,413 the wife, a member of the Pahang
royal family, had helped her commoner hu.sband obtain a state title
and made it easier for him to do business. The husband had given
her substantial sums of money to finance her business at one of the
properties he acquired. Still, her claim to a share of property he ac~
quired, based on her indirect contribution, was upheld. 414 Neither
labor nor capital is now required. .
Harta sepencarian cases now fall witliin the jurisdiction of the
Shariah courts, and the f~mily law enactments empower the court in
divorce cases to order "division between the parties of any assets acquired by them dUring the marriage by their joint efforts."415 Previously, many stich claims came to the secul~r courts, and many of the
expansive judgments were written by secular judges. 416 The liberal
409. Id. at 101. But see Zainuddin v. Anita, 4 J.H. 73 (Fed. Terr. App. Bd. 1982)
(rights due to unequal contributions depend on mutual consent of the parties).
410. [1988] 3 M.L.J. xlix (Fed. Terr. App. Bd. 1988).
.
411. Id. at xl ("[T]he Shariah Court and the 130ard of Appeal in their endeavour to
apply the Islamic law must attempt to find support for the rule of harta sepencarian
in Islamic jurisprudence.").
412. Id. at li.
413. 3 J.H. 125 (Selangor Chief Kadi's Court 1980).
414. But only as to one of several plots ofland.
415. Islamic Family Law (Federal Territory) Act 1984, Act 303, 1984, § 58(1). For
jurisdiction to lodge in the Shariah court, it must, of course, be determined that the
assets in disput.e are harta sepencarian assets. If not, the secular courts may still
have jurisdiction. Noor Jahan v. Md. Yusoff, [1994] 1 M.L.J. 156, 161-63 (High Ct.
1993).
.
'416. Boto', supra n. 403; Mohamed v. Commissioner of Lands and Mines Terengganu, [1968] 1 M.L.J. 227 (High Ct. 1968); Roberts alias Kamarulzaman v. Ummi
Kalthom, [1966] 1 M.L.J. 163 (High Ct. 1966). But see Noor Jahan v. Md. Yusoff,
supra n. 415, at 163 (enunciating the narrower, earlier doctrine, albeit on facts probably insufficient to create a harta sepencarian claim under current doctrine).
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doctrines of these judges have been embraced and even extended by
the Shariah courts. In some other areas of custom, Islamic revivalists have attempted to purify Malay practice of excrescences deriving
from adat or from non-Islamic foreign influences: the worship of keramats, places or persons with supernatural powers, is a good example. But, in marital property, appellate bodies have crafted
expansive doctrine while attempting to fuse harta sepencarian to Islamic sources.
Mansjur is the epitome of this syncretic effort, replete as it is
with citations to Islamic textbooks, hadiths, and Malaysian state
fatwas (legal rulings issued by a mufti or a committee of ulama), as
well as to prior cases based on adat practice. In Mansjur, the appeal
board takes the very different Islamic principle of musha-a principle of separate property that actually seems irrelevant to the adat
concept of joint marital property-and uses it to create a property
interest deriving from a contribution based on neither labor nor capital but on marital status. 417 The fusion of Islamic sources, adat practices, and common law methods is striking.
Since the family law enactments came into effect, such interpretive acts are performed in the shadow of the statute. When the statutes are examined, another powerful foreign element is added to the
mix. The Federal Territory provisions on marital property are lifted
directly from the secular provisions and indirectly from the English
statutory law.
Here, as on some other matters, Kelantan and Perak enacted
provisions significantly different from those of the Federal Territory
model followed by all other states. The Kelantan-Perak provisions
authorize the court, at the time of divorce, to divide property acquired
by husband and wife "during the marriage by their joint efforts" and
also to divide the proceeds of sale of such property.418 The result of
the division need not be a foreordained percentage but is merely to be
"reasonable." In calculating the shares, the two statutes say, courts
should take account of (1) the contributions of each party in money,
property, or labor toward the acquisition of the asset, (2) any debts
incurred by either party for their joint benefit, and (3) the needs of
minor children, if any.419 These two states define harta sepencarian
narrowly to include assets acquired jointly by the exercise of "efforts
and capital contributed by each party."420 Construed strictly, the
statutes would foreclose the award of a share based solely on indirect
417. Mansjur, supra n. 410, at I-Iii.
418. Kelantan Islamic Family Law Enactment 1983, No.1 of 1983, § 46(1); Perak
Islamic Family Law Enactment 1984, No. 13 of 1984, § 54(1).
419. Kelantan Islamic Family Law Enactment 1983, No.1 of 1983, § 46(2); Perak
Islamic Family Law Enactment 1984, No. 13 of 1984, § 54(2).
420. Id.
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contribution, the sort of contribution recognized in Mansjur, Tengku
Anun Zaharah, and other cases. 421
,
The Federal Territory model, adopted in every state other than
Kelantan and Perak, contains the same basic provisions regarding
division of property acquired by joint efforts during the marriage, except that, subject to the same three considerations to be taken into
account in arriving at a division, "the Court shall incline towards
equality of division."422 The Federal Territory and all the states following it then add further subsections missing in the Kelantan and
Perak statutes. These deal squarely with the indirect or constructive
contribution of a spouse, as they ,reaffirm the right of one party to a
marriage to a share of assets acquired through the sole effort or capital of the other.423 In dividing such assets, the statutes provide, the
court should consider "the extent of the contributions made by the
party who did not acquire the assets to the welfare of the family by
looking after the home or caring for the fa.mily . . ." as well as the
needs of minor children; subject to these considerations, the division
should be "reasonable, but in any case the party by whose efforts the
assets were acquired shall receive a greater proportion. "424
Now, of course, this language does not, by itself, authorize a
share based on citizenship status, accompaniment on business trips,
or membership in an influential royal family, but these are modest
interpretive extensions of the provisions, whereas they are a much
greater stretch from the Kelantan-Perak provisions. Conceivably, bifurcated doctrine may emerge among the states. Before the statute
was enacted, Kelantan courts occasionally had a narrower view of
contributionB eligible for a harta sepencarian share;425
The main source of the expansive Federal Territory provisions
does not lie in the liberal harta sepencarian cases but-interestingly
enough~in the statutory provisions applicable to non-Muslims. The
Federal Territory provisions on marital assets are all virtually identical to those of the secular Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act
1976,426 from which they were obviously lifted wholesale. The borrowed secular provisions are enforced in courts sitting solely to decide
421. See supra nn. 402, 403, 410, 413.
422. Islamic Family Law (Federal Territory) Act 1984, Act 303, 1984, § 58(1).
Among states following the Federal Territory model, only Pahang provides for "such
division as is reasonable," rather than inclining toward equal division. Pahang Islamic Family Law Enactment 1987, No.3 of 1987, § 59(2).
423. Islamic Family Law (Federal Territory) Act 1984, Act 303, 1984, § 58(3).
424. Id., § 58(4). This looks as if a two-to-one ratio were contemplated, as in some
of the cases allocating one-third for indirect contribution.
425. See Ahmad Ibrahim, supra n. 406.
426. Act 164, 1976, § 76. Section 76 is nearly verbatim with section 58 of the Islamic Family Law (Federal Territory) Act 1984, Act 303, 1984, down to the matters to
be taken into account in deciding on division, the inclination to equal or reasonable
shares (and shllres weighted by contribution), as well as the definition of "assets acquired during n marriage."
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cases under Islamic law. Here, then, is a direct legal transplant from
one sector of a legal system to another purporting to be animated by
different and to some extent unalterable principles.
There is also a striking similarity of judicial doctrine on the secular and Islamic sides. Adultery of a spouse does not preclude a claim
for division of marital assets under the secular law,427 and neither
does it defeat a claim to harta sepencarian. 428 Some authors suggest
that this rule confirms definitively that haria sepencarian is founded
on adat rather than on Islam, since adultery would preclude claims
founded on Islamic law, to maintenance,429 for example, or to harta
sharikat. 430 (This, however, is an argument that proves too much,
since rules incompatible with Islam ought not to find legal recognition, and the Islamic disapproval of adultery is unequivocal.) Judicial recognition of the companionship contribution of a spouse who
advanced neither capital nor labor to acquire the property is also exactly the same as the recognition accorded to such a contribution in
English law431 and in Malaysian secular law under the Law Refonn
(Marriage and Divorce) Act. 432
Not all of this similarity can be attributed to direct statutory borrowing, for the doctrinal evolution was well underway before the Islamic family law enactments were passed. Rather, the cases
presented well defined, conventional opportunities for the usual common law development. Judges probably also found it inconceivable,
knowing the secular law as they did, that Muslim wives should be left
with less marital property than non-Muslim wives were. But with
the direct borrowing of the harta sepencarian provisions from the
marital asset provisions applicable to non-Muslims (which provisions
bear some resemblance to those of the English Matrimonial Causes
Act 1973433 ), and with the confinnation of their liberal interpretation
as a matter of Islamic law, the marriage of adat, English law, common law method, and Islamic law was consummated. A right
originating in custom is framed in tenns similar to those of English
law and reconceptualized as Islamic by statute and judicial decisions.
Harta sepencarian is still emerging law, and it is also merging lawan example of the strongest possible syncretism.
427. See Suzanna Mohamed Isa, Harta Sepencarian: An Overview 56 (1991) (unpublished LL.B. Honours project paper, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia).
428. See Hj. Salleh, supra n. 391, at 6-8.
.
429. See id. at 7; Suzanna, supra n. 427, at 36. See also Islamic Family Law (Federal Territory) Act 1984, Act 303, 1984, § 65(1) (right of divorced wife to receive maintenance ceases on adultery).
430. See Abdul M~id, supra n. 394, at 34.
431. See Suzanna, supra n. 427, at 48 n. 2.
432. See id. at 56-59 (description of cases decided under the statute applicable to
non-Muslims).
433. C. 18, §§ 24-25. In section 24, however, the English act contains options be~
yond mere division of marital property; and, in section 25, it mandates that the courts
take account of a wider range of circumstances than the Malaysian acts do.
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Consolatory Gifts: Clarified Doctrine, Enhanced
Enforcement

If these were the forces at work in harta sepencarian cases, a
slightly different configuration has been involved in muta'ah cases.
Until recently, there w~re few muta'ah claims, and the amounts recovered were trivial. Neither is true now. The computation of
muta'ah waH regarded by courts and commentators as antiquated
and conceptually impoverished. In recurrent cases, particular judges
have taken the lead in spelling out the entitlement, and the growth of
a Malay propertied middle class and a Shariah bar with financial incentives to bring larger claims has breathed new life into the law of
consolatory gifts. In contrast to marital' property, the!3e developments have proceeded without explicit reference to the law applicable
to non-Muslims, but they may still produce parallel results.
No doubt the changing economic condition of the Malays since
the 1970s-their increasing urbanization, representation in' commerce and the professions, and participation in the modern sector of
the economy-also played a role in harta sepencarian doctrine. The
more property is owned, the more claims to joint ownership are plausible; Malays clearly own more now, particularly in and around Kuala Lumpur, where ~uch of the new law is being made.
The muta'ah obligation, however, is open-ended. Harta sepencarian requires a fractional share of a fixed quantum of property.
The muta'ah statutes do not relate to specific property..They simply
require that a woman who "has been divorced without just cause" be
paid an amount that is "fair and just," "appropriate and just," or "appropriate and fair."434 The relevant Quranic verse requires divorced
wives to be provided with a "gift of reasonable amount," from the
"wealthy [husband] according to his means, and the poor according to
his means."4.35 The principal inquiry is thus into the husband's ability to pay, and that ability is much greater than it formerly was.
434. Islamic Family Law (Federal Territory) Act' 1984, Act 303, 1984, § 56 ("fair
and just"); Kelantan Islamic Family Law Enactment ,1983, No. l! of 1983, § 44 ("appropriate and just"); Kedah Islamic Family Law Enactment 1979, No.1 of 1984, § 47
("appropriate and fair"). Only Malacca has no explicit requirement (though it is likely
implicit) that the woman be divorced without just cause, and Malacca also does not
specify that she be divorced by the husband, the implication being that she may initio
ate the divorce and still receive muta'ah. Malacca Islamic Family Law Enactment
1983, No.8 of 1983, § 44. Even if the wife is the plaintiff, she may still recover
muta'ah if the divorce action is for taklik (since the husband's breach of condition
would be wronl~ul), possibly even for khul', but perhaps not for fasakh. See Zalikhah
binti Mohd. Nor, "Mut'ah di dalam Islam [Muta'ah in Islam]," 3 'J.H. 147, 153 (1983).
See also Sharifah Sapoyah v. Wan AIwi, 6 J.H. 259 (Sarawak Chief Kadi's Ct. 1988)
(muta'ah in taldik and khul' but not fasakh); Noor Bee v. Ahmad Shanusi, 1 J.H. 63
(Penang Chief Kadi's Ct. 1978) (muta'ah in khul' but not in fasakh); Zaitoon Dato'
Othman, "Hak Wanita Menuntut Mutaah [Women's Rights to Claim Muta'ah],"
Malays. L. News, Jan. 1993, at 8, 9 (no muta'ah in fasakh cases).
435. The Glorious Quran, supra n. 305, at 94-95.
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Several conventions formerly limited muta'ah. One was that
muta'ah was voluntary, and at most the kadi could cajole a bit more
out of the husband than he was initially willing to pay. Another was
that the amount should not exceed half of the mas kahwin (dowry),
which is relatively smallin Malaysia. 436 A third was that muta'ah is
a form of compensation for service that ought to vary with the length
of the marriage: a common calculation was M$l for each day of the
marriage. This is still the rule followed by some Shariah court judges
in Singapore. 437
These inhibitions on muta'ah are not altogether gone in Malaysia, but they are going fast. Muta'ah is mandatory; its calculation is
based on ability to pay; token payments are inadequate; and the dollar-a-day rule has been expressly repudiated by an appeal committee. 438 So vested is the right held to be that a wife's recalcitrance,
which might deny her eddah maintenance, does not necessarily pre:.
clude her claim to muta'ah,439 and her failure to cook or wash or care
for her husband is deemed irrelevant, for these are not held to be
obligatory chores. 44o
Some of these rules were laid down iri a series of eas~s decided by
the Chief Kadi of Penang, Haji Harussani bin Haji Zakaria, in the
late 1970s and early' 1980s. Long concerned with the proper implementation of Shariah,441 Haji Harussani proceeded to award muta'ah
proportionate to the husband's ability to pay.442 The amounts were
generally modest, but the Chief Kadi ofteri granted muta'ah even
where the wife had initiated the divorce, provided the husband was
unable to prove she was at fault in breaking up the marriage. 443 In
addition to ability to pay, the Chief Kadi also considered the status
and positive demeanor of the wife; in one or two cases, the amounts
seem to have been enhanced where wives had proved their devo436. See Zalikha, supra n. 434, at 150.
437. Interviews, Singapore, January 28,29, 1993.
438. Rokiah bte. Haji Abdul Jalil v. Mohamed Idris bin Shamsudin, [1989] 3
M.L.J. ix, xii (Fed. Terr. App. Comm. 1989); Piah binti Said v. Che Lah bin Awang, 3
J.H. 220 (Penang Chief Kadi's Ct., 1983).
439. Rokiah, supra n. 438, at xii. Contra: Zainoon v. Mohamed Zain, supra n. 394,
at 113 (no muta'ah if wife deserts matrimonial home). The problem is that if the
wife's recalcitrance is deemed to have caused the divorce she will be adjudged as not
lacking in fault and so ineligible for muta'ah.
440. Rokiah, supra n. 438, at xii.
.
441. See the Haji Harussani Report, supra n. 182.
442. Piah, supra n. 438; Ramlah v. Mohamed, 1 J.H. 77 (Penang Chief Kadi's Ct.
1980); Zawiyah v. Raslan, 1 J.H. 91 (Penang Chief Kadi's Ct. 1980); Rahmah v.
Mohamed Yusofi', 1 J.H. 75 (Penang Chief Kadi's Ct. 1979); Normaidiah v. Azhari, 1
J.H. 91 (Penang Chief Kadi's Ct. 1979); Rosnah v. Ibrahim, 1 J.H. 94 (Penang Chief
Kadi's Ct. 1979); Sabariah v. Zainol, 1 J.H. 99 (Penang Chief Kadi's Ct. 1979); Noor
Bee, supra n. 434.
443. Ramlah, supra n. 442; Rosnah, supra n. 442.
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tion. 444 Along the way, it was made clear that the consolatory gift
was, not to remunerate services but rather to compensate for any embarrassment the wife might feel upon divorce, to avoid any rumors
that· she was at fault, and to provide her with the wherewithal to
start a new life. 445 These are now the accepted underpinnings of
muta'ah. 446
On such established rules are laid the foundations for much
larger claim:;.447 In Kuala Lumpur, there have already been claims
for as much as M$5 million. 448 Particularly in the capital, where a
Shariah bar experienced in secular litigation has developed, the financial rewards of ,pursuing muta'ah are considerable.
Muta'ah litigation is a source of procedural innovation. The
Shariah courts are not accustomed to extended discovery, but the
problem for lawyers seeking muta'ah for divorced wives is to locate
and prove the husbands' assets. Lawyers are well aware of the provisionsin the Islamic civil procedure enactments that if there is a lacuna the kadi is to resort to the civil rules applicable to the secular
subordinate COurtS. 449 In one major case, for example, an application
has been made for further and better particulars to compel the husband to disclose his assets. 450 If assets have been located, some of
them may be liable to attachment. Moreover, where the matter is
lucrative, elaborate arguments, drawn from practice in the secular
courts, are increasingly pressed on the kadis.
, 'On the, other hand, husbands are also represented, and litigation
planning can be practiced to avoid muta'ah. Assets can be transferred or placed in trust for children, so as to disadvantage a wife who
makes chuDls on them. 451 In all of these ways, litigation in the
Shariah court stands to become far more complex.
The last word has probably not been spoken on the standards for
the award ofmuta'ah. If the kadi is to look ahead in making a consolatory award in a case where the husband is affluent, should the kadi
444. Ramlah, supra n. 442 (half of husband's net salary for one month); Noor Bee,
supra n. 434 (noting wife's dedication).
445. Noor Bee, supra n. 434.
446. See Nillgal alias Yang Chik bte. Hashim v. Jamal bin Abdul Rahim, [1989] 2
M.L.J. xxix, xxxi-xxxii (Fed. Terr. App. Comm. 1988) (citing Penang cases with approval and enunciating similar rules); Zaitoon, supra n. 434 at 9-11; Zalikhah, supra
n. 434, at 151-56.
447. Cf. Nik Noriani Nik Badli Shah, Family Law: Maintenance and Other Financial Rights 36-37 (1993) (arguing that muta'ah awards should .be more substantial).
448. Tengku Puteri Zainah v. Dato' Seri Mohd. Najib, Civil No. 41187 (Fed. Terr.
.
.
Chief Kadi's Ct.).
449. See, e.lt., Selangor Syariah Civil Procedure Enactment 1991, No.7 of 1991,
§ 60(1).
450. Tengku Puteri Zainah v. Dato' Seri Mohd. Najib, supra n. 448 (application
filed July 22, 1.992). The kadi subsequently denied the application, but the general
availability of procedural devices drawn from the secular sector remains.
451. Here and elsewhere in this section, I have benefited from interviews with several members I)f the Shariah bar in Kuala Lumpur.
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consider what is needed for the wife to maintain herself beyond the
eddah period, or should the kadi simply award a fraction of the husband's assets, which is the way at least some lawyers representing
wives plan and shape their demands? If muta'ah is designed to give
the wife a fresh start, is it not a form of a quite non-Islamic lump-sum
alimony? There is every reason to think that, with standards so indeterminate, there is much room for expansion of doctrine as well as of
awards. 452
3. The Two Payments and the Sources of Change
Together, liability for harta sepencarian and muta'ah may come
increasingly to deter husbands from divorcing their wives. 453 The
doctrines, with their respect for housework and rejection of defenses
based on the wife's recalcitrance, are obviously also reshaping relations between the sexes. Together, too, harta sepencarian and
muta'ah may also help compensate for what is otherwise a harsh consequence of the Islamic divorce regime: no maintenance beyond the,
100 days of eddah.
, If the two obligations work in tandem in this way, their revival or
current strength derives from two contrasting sets of developments.
Harta sepencarian is a creature of Malay adat, not of Islamic law,
and it has been embellished and expanded through common law adjudication and complete adoption of the secular statute, whose roots are
neither in adat nor in Islam. The main source of the change, in other
words, is the adjacent English legal systeDl' Muta'ah, however, is a
wholly Islamic obligation, the reconceptualization of which cannot be
traced directly to adat or to common law. There is, for example, nothing in explicit, established doctrine that makes muta'ah into a kind of
Islamic alimony-a concept that does not exist. But muta'ah and the
ability of kadis' courts to utilize what are for them new procedural
techniques seem to be in a phase of incipient expansion by virtue of
the importation of litigation techniques arid arguments from the
same adjacent secular system. The spillover effects on the kadis'
courts will be significant.
In the one case, then, the law alone has expanded. In the other,
the complexity of the Shariah court as an institution is also expanding, as zealous enforcement of the clarified obligation increases.
The effect of both, when the dollars have been added together, is to
produce substantial changes in the de facto rights of divorced middle-'
class Malay women.
452. On the inadequacy of awards and the indeterminacy of standards for deciding
on the appropriate amount, see Zaitoon, supra n. 434, at 11, 29. On muta'ah as a kind
of de facto alimony in Morocoo; cf. Ziba Mir.Hosseini, Marriage on Trial: A Study of
Islamic Family Law 90·91 (1993).
453. Which is what such financial obligations are said already to do for middle'
class Muslims. Azizah, supra n. 243, at 110.
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LEGAL ACCULTURATION AND THE QUEST FOR AUTHENTICITY

An old Italian maxim has it that "if things are going to stay the
same around here, there are going to have to be some changes." The
epigram doe8 not, of course, describe the far-reaching Malaysian
changes, which were certainly not produced to make sure that the
legal system stayed the same. Yet, beneath the cynicism of the aphorism is a flash of insight that does apply in Malaysia: the flood of
changes is anchored to some deep continuities in the Malaysian legal
system as a whole, and many of the Islamic changes have strong connections to the secular law.
To provide a truly satisfying explanation for the adoption and
content of the new body of Islamic law of Malaysia, ~t is necessary to
move beyond. the commonly articulated approaches to legal change
and into more specific 'propositions concerning the selection of sources
for legal innovation, the fit between borrowed rules and the system
into which they are to be received, and the relations between sectors
of dual legal systems. Above all, it is necessary to explore more fully
a force that both motivates legal change and defines its scope: the
quest for a legal system that is felt to be authentic. After a brief summation of how the main approaches fare against the Malaysian evidence, we shall turn to a more serious treatment of issues
surrounding borrowing, dualism, and authenticity.
A.

Approaches to Legal Change and the Mirror of Authenticity

There is some evidence in the Malaysian materials for nearly
every approach to legal change except the most deterministic. Consistent with evolutionist concepts, there is ,developmental change,
manifested by increased complexity, institutional differentiation, and
the predominance of official, lawyers' law over earlier, less formal
versions. Consistent with utilitarian presuppositions, there is room
to interpret at least some doctrinal changes in functionalist terms.
The central theme of utilitarian approaches-cost reduction-is not
much in evidence, even in commercial law, where Islamic rules regarding interest may make transactions less efficient. But the expansion of institutions such as harta sepencarian and muta'ah are
compatible with a broadly conceived functionalist interpretation, insofar as they provide ways for women to escape the potentially impoverishing consequences of Islamic inheritance and divorce law. 454
Consistent with social change approaches, some new rules have encountered resistance where opinion or practice is more traditional. 455
Consistent with intentionalist views, the choice of specific rules and
454. In part for such reasons, it appears, some countries with large Muslim minority populations have, by statute, repealed the Islamic rules of succession to property.
See, e.g., AKP. Kludze, Modern Law of Succession in Ghana 229-36 (1988).
455. See supra at 276, 279, 282, 288-89, 546.
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institutions is made by lawyers acting with some degree of autonomy,
albeit lawyers set in motion by politicians. Except insofar as extreme
versions of some theories postulate truly invisible hands and automatic processes, there is no necessary contradiction among the
approaches.
One reason that each approach has something pertinent to say
but that none excludes alternatives to it is that the approaches are
cast at different levels of analysis. The closer one looks at particular
rules and institutions, the more dominant the role of intentional activity seems to be. The more the emphasis is on overall patterns, the
more plausible it is to explain. emerging configurations in terms of
evolutionary imperatives or drives toward efficiency. At an intermediate level, differences of opinion and practice among states and social groups come more into focus.
Take the growing formality of the system and role of trained lawyers. The degree to ,which the transformation of Islamic law is characterized by more elaborate procedural techniques and heightened
professionalization is largely attributable to the particular choices
made by the reformers. There is nothing inexorable about the growth
of these characteristics. The more abstract evolutionary formulations
neglect the incontestable fact that a different choice of reformers
(ulama, for example) would have produced a completely different set
of reforms, certainly one characterized by far less formality and infinitely less common law borrowing.
Or consider the role of changing opinion and social practice,
which turns out to be quite complex. As indicated, differences of
opinion and practice do account for the differential adoption of reforms among some of the Malaysian states, most notably Kelantan.
But some other states chose one or another version of a statute much
more because of professional networks among the reformers than because of any different distribution of opinion. 456 Where social practice and opinion do playa role, it is easier, in some cases, to attribute
resistance to innovation to the absence of social change than it is to
attribute the choice of legal rules and institutions to any modifications of opinion ·or practice. Even then, a good many revised doctrines prevail even in the face of contrary opinion; on only a few
issues is dissident public opinion aroused at all. Changes in opinion
among elites, from which the reformers are drawn-on polygamy and
equal rights to divorce, for example-appear considerably more importa:Q.t than are even broadly-based changes in opinion among any
other sectors.
456. For example, former students of Professor Ahmed Ibrahim, a leading exponent of the Federal Territory model, are located in key positions in many states. Likewise,large parts.ofthe Kelantan model appear to have been adopted in Perak because
of the transfer of the Kelantan legal adviser to that state.
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Furthermore, the sequence of change is the reverse of the one
identified for the history of English divorce law by Lawrence
Stone. 457 In England, judges and then legislators sought to reduce
the dissonance between law and the changing social conditions that
brought the law into disrepute. In Malaysia, legislative drafters and
a handful of appellate judges have imposed the changes on occasionally-reluctant kadis, whose only sense of dissonance relates to the
disparity between the new law and the prevailing Shafi'i doctrine.
The English changes were bottom-up; the Malaysian changes have
been top-down.
No approach is without substantial opposing evidence, and even
together the various approaches do not explain the Malaysian
changes fully. The approaches are not wrong so much as they are
inadequate, because they miss an issue that must playa major part
in fundamental systemic change-and the more fundamental, the
more major the part it must play: the iss~e of authenticity. A legal
system does not need merely to promote efficiency, or to align particular doctrines with particular opinions or social practices, or to follow
developmental imperatives, or to suit the knowledge and interests of
lawyers and reformers. A legal system must be regarded as morally
. appropriate for and by the people it governs. 458
Quite obviously, general notions about the moral inappropriateness of the neglect of the Islamic sector of the legal system and its
formal subordination to the secular sector motivated the Malaysian
reforms. But the sense of inappropriateness does not determine
which successor institutions will be held to be appropriate. The
choice of those institutions can be a complex matter, and the Malaysian materials show it to be determined by (1) the identity of the reformers, (2) the strength of the adjacent legal system, (3) the desire of
the reformers to create a new system comparable to it, and (4) the
ability of the reformers to borrow from a variety of presumptively legitimate repositories of rules and institutions.
In all their efforts, the Malaysian reformers were abetted by the
tolerance of the wider society-including the Islamic opposition459for an ecle.ctic reconstruction of. the Islamic legal system. If some
ulama held a priori standards of Islamic purity, these were generally
(but not always) overcome by the reformers' diligent pursuit of a system of institutions that could match the secular system. Even Is457. See supra at 249-50.
458. Compare Geertz's remark that authenticity is a sense that truth and falsehood, virtue and vice are "appropriately aligned." Geertz, supra n. 37, at 231.
459. Shariff! Zaleha, supra n. 128, at 6, notes, quite appropriately, that not even
the dakwah (Illlamic revival) groups have challenged the version of Shariah produced
by the "present carriers ofIslamic law." She implies that the reforms have legitimacy,
a judgment amply supported by the overt approval or acquiescence that has greeted
the vast majority of them.
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lamic opposition politicians, who might have been expected to object
to the borrowed content of many of the new legal norms, have been
more than acquiescen.t. To be sure, they embarrassed the government because of its failure to implement hudud punishments,460 and
some of them had private reservations about the shift from informal
to formal procedure or the threat that codification posed to legal exegesis from original Islamic sotirces. 461 Nevertheless, they understood
that the government's reform of Islamic law was so generally satisfying to the Muslim population that it put the opposition in a difficult,
defensive position.
Pace Savigny, one conclusion that emerges with utmost clarity
from the Malaysian materials is that to be authentic a legal system
does not need. to be indigenous. If legal authenticity means that a
people must be able to see itself in its law-and that is what it
means-authenticity does not have a single face.
B.

Borrowing and Legal Dualism

The quest for more authentic law utilizes techniques of borrowing and transplantation; and, as Watson notes, the reformers are
likely to borrow only from sources with which they are familiar. But
in two respects the process goes beyond what Watson so well
describes.
,
.
First, the ability 'of the reformers to choose new law does not belong to them alone. They are working in collaboration with political
leaders. The Malaysian borrowing would have been different if the
agenda of the politicians had been different, and their agenda might
have been different (and probably less extensive) had they faced less
political competition.
Second, the transplanting reformers were not merely reflecting
professional bias in their choice of sources. They also had their eye
on a larger set of issues. Although they nowhere articulated their
standards in this way, the drafters and interpreters behaved, as if
their product had to have several attributes: (1) It had to have an
Islamic pedigree, a claim to derive from Islamic sources. (2) The
product had to be what they would call, an up-to-date, upgraded version-a guide to conduct and process (a) that is professionally coherent and ,interpretable through an orderly system of adjudication, (b)
that, without sacrificing Islamic morality, is not blatantly oppressive
toward women, and (c) that is as efficient in its methods as the secular law is. (3) It had also to be a force propelling Malay society, often
460. See supra at 260-61. The federal government has recently made it clear that
it will not support the constitutional amendment that would be required for Kelantan's hudud statute to become effective. Cf. supra n. 149.
461. I am drawing here on an interview with a prominent Islamic law expert affiliated to the opposition Parti Islam, Bangi, Selangor, March 12, 1991.
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regarded by its elites as insufficiently attup.ed to the requirements of
the modern world, toward competitiveness, pursuit of material wellbeing, and characterological correctness (personal responsibility, uprightness, goal directedness). The modern character of the law was
important to them. As a member of the Technical Committee wrote,
one reason to keep open the door of ijtihad (discretion to interpret
legal source!!) is to enable Islamic law to keep up with the times, lest
it fall into disrepute. 462
This combination of implicit objectives explains much of the
character of the reforms: the inclination to prefer progressive rules,
drawn selectively from other Islamic schools and countries, to the unreconstructed Shafi'i law prevalent in Malaysia; the extraordinary efforts to regularize courts, kadis, and appellate bodies, as well as rules
of evidence and procedure, and to subject the courts to a doctrine of
precedent; the outright hostility toward irresponsibly pronounced
talaks, unequal divorce rights, polygamy, failure to pay zakat, and
arbitrariness in judicial procedure. These vices all become moral
faults in need of legal rectification as the quest for an a'l-lthentic law is
linked to the search for a new Malay character.
Moreover-and this is crucial-authenticity is enhanced if the
authenticat.~d version stands up well to the competition. In the Malaysian case, the competition is the secular legal system. Hence the
willingness to borrow liberally from the secular side where Islam has
not spoken and to adopt even some rules in contravention of Islamic
rules. Amo:ng these is the common law prohibition on hearsay-a
prohibition that, while not always enforced in court, meets in Malaysia with no principled Islamic objection whatever.
On all this, the reformers are completely candid. A leading
drafter, Professor Ahmad Ibrahim, describes the drafting process as
starting with the secular law and modifying it only where Shariah
requires a different rule. 463 (In some cases, notably marital property,
the process is better described as lifting of the secular rule verbatim
and not modifying it even where Islamic law differs.) Another member of the 1~echnical Committee describes the operative, permissive
principle of rule borrowing: "If is not inconsistent [with Islam], we
462. A. Monir, supra n. 327. Similar statements are legion. See, e.g., Abdullah
Abu Bakar & Nadzim Abd. Rahman,' The Recent Development in Muslim Family
Law: The Malaysian Experience 30 (unpuhlishedpaper presented at the International Shariah Conference on the Recent Developments in Muslim Family Law, Pusat
Islam, Kuala Lumpur, Aug. 3-5, 1990) (need "to appreciate that Islam is capable of
answering the challenges of time."). Abdullah and Nadzim endorse an eclectic search
to insure that Islamic law keeps up; it is necessary, they say, "to dive into the sea and
obtain the pearls of intellectual wisdom for [this] purpose." Id. On ijtihad in general,
see Weiss, supra n. 23.
463. Ahmad Ibrahim, "The Shariah and Codification-Malaysia Experience," 1987
Shariah L.J. 47, 58.
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take it as Islamic. "464 A leader of a powerful dakwah group agrees.
The answers to modern problems are not found in classical sources or
in the learning of ulama. Needing improvement, Islamic thought includes that which does not contradict Islam. 465 Such a formulation
licenses liberal borrowing.
A close examination of the background arguments for Shariah
and its reform in Malaysia reveals their antinomial, even mutually
contradictory, quality. On the one side are claims that Islamic law is,
contrary to stereotype, a developed system able to meet the challenges of modernity. Indeed, the general Islamic system is explicitly
compared to the English system and not found wanting, even occasionally found superior. Hence Ali Baharum, in a study of the contractual capacity of minors, concludes that Islamic law is more
flexible and subtle than the English law, which relies on a fixed age of
majority.466 In a book on the law of misrepresentation, he shows that
considerable overlap exists between English and Islamic doctrine,
but he frequently points to a superior Islamic rule. 467 In the same
vein, some writers have suggested that the emerging Anglo-American
rules on irretrievable breakdown of marriage have, "perhaps unconsciously, marched in the direction of the Islamic Law of divorce based
on the doctrine of shiqaq [unbridgeable marital discord]."468 But if,
on this side, a certain defensive chauvinism is in evidence, on the
other side is the recognition that Islamic law, though once a great
system, languished with the worldwide decline of Islam. It had great
moments in and after the time of the Prophet, again in Grenada and
in the Ottoman Empire, but now it needs to be redeveloped. 469 The
464. The quotation is drawn from ali interview in Kuala Lumpur, April 15, 1992.
Cf. Hashim Mehat, Syariah Sebaga: Satu Sumber Common Law Malaysia: Harapan
dan Hakikat [Syariah as a Source of Malaysian Common Law: Hopes and Reality] 20
(unpublished paper presented at the Seminar on Syariah and Common Law, Kuala
Lumpur, Pusat Islam, 16-17 May 1992) (any custom widely and fully practiced, and
not inconsistent with Islamic principles, is acceptable; citing-revealingly-harta
sepencarian, which is difficult to reconcile completely with Islamic law).
465. I am drawing here on a lengthy interview with a national leader of an influential Islamic organization, Bangi, Feb. 28, 1991.
466. Mohd. Ali lfj. Baharum, "Minor Contract Under English and Islamic Law of
Contract," 1 Jurnal Perundungan 46 (1989).
467. Mohd. Ali Baharum, Misrepresentation: A Study of English and Islamic Contract Law (1988).
468. S. Jaffer Hussain, "Marriage Breakdown Under the Law Reform (Marriage
and Divorce) Act, 1976, and in Islam: A Comparative View," 1 Int'l Islamic U. L.J.
113, 138 (1989). See id. at 115. See also Ahmad Ibrahim, "Islamic Law in Malaysia,"
Malays. L. News, July 1992, at 24,27.
In Malaysia, however, the sequence was the opposite, as the Islamic statutes converged with the previously-enacted secular statutory provisions on divorce. See supra
nn. 265-71 and accompanying text.
469. Cf. Abdur Rahman Ibn Abdul Aziz al Qassim, "The Idea of .Codifying the
Sharia Rules: Its Past, Present and Future," 3 Contemp. Jurisp. Res. J. (No.4) (Riyadh) 21, 25 (Jan.-Mar. 1992) (Islam needs a "developed Islamic jurisprudence....
able to respond to the changing needs of contemporary life . . . .").
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only practicable way to do this is by borrowing. Do these conflicting
arguments, taken together, not furnish a warrant for change that is
simultaneouBly Islamic and English? Do they not together predict a
hybridized law, drawing heavily on the competitor that is ahead?
English law, in its Malaysian secular incarnation, is, then, the
reference model for the reformers. Anyone who doubts the influence
of the surrounding legal environment on the reformers should consider that their view of an appropriately structured Islamic legal system for Malaysia is even colored by the secular governmental system
in which they find themselves. The secular court system in Malaysia
is unitary-there are no state judges -and the presence of state Islamic judiciaries creates a sense of dissonance that reinforces the reformers' desire to centralize the Shariah system and make it uniform.
This is one of the most recurrent elements in their discourse,47o and
it points to what they regard as unfinished business: the creation of a
single Shariah system in Malaysia.
It is not uncommon for perceived internal deficiencies to give rise
to positive attitudes toward external norms. 471 Nor, of course, is
legal borrowing more generally uncommon. On the contrary,
although thl~ frequency of borrowing varies from time· to time and
place to plaee, borrowing is a longstanding method of legal change.
AB R.H. Helmholz has shown, the common law borrowed defamation
actions and bankruptcy statutes from the canon law in the sixteenth
century, while at roughly the same time ecclesiastical lawyers were
copying forms used in the royal courtS.472 In medieval Europe, linked
by the lingua franca of Latin, borrowing across jurisdictions was common. Linguistic separation and ultimately the nationalism of the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries seem to have created an exceptional situation in which borrowing was somewhat less common, but
the more recent diffusion of legal ideas suggests that this has already
changed. 473
Yet we continue to· know little about the conscious and unconscious processes by which borrowing, seepage, and transplantation
take place, and much of what we think we know is wrong. 474 In a
celebrated article, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law,475 Otto
470. See, e.g., A. Monir, supra n. 327, at 23-24; Abu Hurairah, supra n. 318, at 54;
Ahmad Ibrahim, supra n. 160, at xix; Chemo S. Jallow, supra n. 49, at 99.
471. Merton & Kitt, "Reference Group Theory and Social Mobility," in Class, Status and Power 409 (Reinhard Bendix & Seymour Martin Lipset eds. 1953).
472. R. H. Helmholz, Canon Law and English Common Law 8-15 (Selden Society
Lecture, July 5, 1982; 1983).
473. See nn. 39-43, supra, and accompanying text.
474. It is most certainly not true that "[l]egal transplants practically never work."
Robert B. Seidman, The State, Law and Development 34 (1978). While it may be true
thatthe law imported by Ataturk's Turkey was more effective in the commercial field
than in family life, see Yehezkel Dror, "Law and Social Change," 33 Tulane L. Rev.
787,799 (1959), the same is not true without considerable qualification in Malaysia.
475. 37 Mod. L. Rev. 1 (1974).
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Kahn-Freund suggested that procedural law is hardest to transplant,
because national characteristics get in the way, particularly the habits of the bar, conservative as it often is with respect to modes of 'proceeding.476 The Malaysian Islamic case might seem to be in direct
contradiction, since the secular English models of civil and criminal
procedure, of evidence, of trial and appellate structure, and of common law adjudication were, with some modifications, imported across
the boundary on a wholesale basis. This suggests a major distinction
between external borrowing (across countries) and internal borrowing (within countries). Dual systems within countries would seem to
have no special difficulty borrowing procedural institutions across
system boundaries, precisely for reasons of familiarity. In fact, everything we know about dual systems suggests the hybridization of their
judicial procedures, as well as of their methods of decision and their
conceptual apparatus. 477
Several other characteristics of dual systems are manifest in the
Malaysian case, which sheds light on the phenomenon of legal dualism in general. As political power, shifts between the segments underlying the dual system, there is 'often a tendency toward
purification, an effort to cleanse excrescences and return to the perceived original version. With the rise of resentment against English
law, there was thus an effort to restore the unsullied civil law in Quebec and the Roman-Dutch law in South Africa to their original state
and their rightful status. 478 Typically, these efforts fail to pull the
systems apart or to revive the legal status quo ante, although they
may well alter the relative prestige of the two systems. An equal and
opposite tendency is to end the duality itself, either by choosing decisively one system over the other or by fusing the two. For legal positivists and centralists, dualism or pluralism is an "imperfect,»
anomalous, state of affairs. 479 The Malaysian evidence is strong that
in a variety of ways dualism' creates discomfort and inconvenience
among the participants, who move, when they can, to reduce the dis476. Id. at 20.
477. van Blek, "The Genesis of the 'Modernist-Purist' Debate: A Historical Bird'sEye View," 47 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse ~eg 255, 260 (1984);,
Howes, "From Polyjurality to Monojurality: The Transformation of Quebec Law,
1875-1929," 32 McGill L.J. 523,530-31,534 (1987); Lemieux, "The Quebec Civil Law
System in a Common Law World: The Seven Crises," 34 Juridical Rev. 16,27 (1989);
White, "Some Problems of a Hybrid Legal System: A Case Study of St. Lucia," 30 Int'l
& Compo L.Q. 862, 870 (1981); Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Survival of Civil Law in
North America 3-4 (unpublished remarks, mimeographed, no date). .
478. See Howes, supra n. 477, at 547; van Blek, supra n. 477, at 256-60.
479. Griffiths, "What Is Legal Pluralism?," 24 J. Leg. Pluralism 1,8 (1986). Dual
legal systems are poorly understood by positivist theories, since in principle the single
sovereign could abolish one of the parallel systems at will. See John Chipman Gray,
The Nature and Sources of the Law 328 (2d ed. 1921). For the unifying tendency in
Louisiana's early legal system, see George Dargo, Jefferson's Louisiana: Politics and,
The Clash of Legal Traditions 168 (1975).
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sonance between systems. The result is the Malaysian paradoxwhich may not be atypical-that, even as the systems are pulled
apart, restratified, and relegitimized, the dissonance between the
rules and institutions of the two is reduced 'and their content actually
converges.
In the process of recovering authenticity through legal change,
two impulse!! that seem at odds must ultimately find reconciliation.
The first is the urge to ,purify, to recapture, to retrieve a sense of
loss-in this case, lost law. The second is the urge to reduce the dissonance between legal systems found in the same space, for, like
other forms of dissonance, legal dissonance is, oftep. experienced as
disturbing and unnaturaL 480 The reconciliation of these impulsespurification through convergence, so to speak-takes place through
the medium of comparison. An authentic law must have the ability
to withstand comparative scrutiny-which is to say that the specific
content of law deemed authentic may be less important'than that it
catch up with the competition, even if that means appropriating some
of its legal norms. Legal convergence can thus go hand-in-hand with
the recovery of legal authenticity. '
"
The means to dissonance reduction is the participation of reformers active in both systems. ,However much they say they are in one
system looking in at the other, in fact, as academics, they often write
on both systems, and, as practitioners and drafters, too, they act in
both. 481 Accordingly, they find it easy to carry the assumptions of
one system straight into the other. The institutions and habits of one
system can come to infuse the work of another through a process of
.
legal acculturation.
One function that the convergence of the two systems performs is
to assuage, to some extent, the fear among nominally obser.vant, middle-class Malaysian Muslims that there will be a retreat to obscurantism. Among them, there is little respect for ulama, whom they
often view as dropouts from the secular school system, and there is
little confidence that the Islamic system is up to the demands of the
modern world. They often see it as intruding on personal freedomthe freedom to take an occasional alcoholic drink, for example-and
they resent the constant drumbeat of support for it.
Such views go further among some Malay members of the bar,
whose admiration for British justice goes hand in himd with a certain
disdain for their image of a traditional Islamic system. They would
mourn the passing ofthe common law. Since the public expression of
480. See generally Griffiths, supra n. 479; Dargo, supra n. 479. See also McKnight,
"Some Historical Observations on Mixed Systems of Law," [1977] Juridical Rev. 179,
184-86. .
. '
481. For example, Professor Ahmad Ibrahim is an authority on the secular family
law, as he is on Islamic law; Dr. M~nir Yaacob has written a general introduction to
the Malaysian legal system, supra n. 114.
I
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their position would be understood as unacceptable opposition to Islam, they sometimes express, in muted terms, sarcasm for the conformity enforced by those they see as sanctimonious opponents at the
bar and in the intelligentsia, those who embrace Islamic virtue with
conspicuous piety and so are able to dominate the surface level of
debate. The eft'ortsof the reformers' to infuse the new Islamic law
with common law concepts and procedures induce a sigh of relief
among those who revere English law.
Simultaneously, then, staunch proponents of Islam and detractors of Islamic law are mollified by a course of innovation that is
heavy on the convergence of legal systems. There is even talk of a
new Malaysian common law, to which English and Islamic practice
could make the main contributions. 482
Now, of course, the content of the two systems does not converge
in every way. But elements of divergence between the Malaysian secular and Islamic systems are not attributable to any revival oflapsed
law on the Islamic side of the boundary. Long-lapsed law rarely revives. Rather, new Islamic rules are borrowed from other Islamic
source systems, alleged to have affinity with the borroWing system.
In the Malaysian case, such Islamic source systems are found mainly
in Pakistan, India, and Singapore. 483 Although they sometimes
speak of reviving "pure" Islamic law, the borrowers are actually looking for desirable rules and institutions that can be imported from
live, working systems.
The choice of those systems, however, is significant. The main
source coup.tries are also former British colonies, and all of them have
been subject to similar transactions across the legal boundary between Islamic sacred and English secular. The geographically and
linguistically proximate Islamic systems of Indonesia and the southern Philippines are not altogether unknown,484 but they are significantly less well known, more foreign in spirit, and less plausible as
sources for borrowing. The style of the legislation borrowed and the
mode of interpretation utilized in India, Pakistan, and Singapore are
infused with a common-law ethos. And so even borrowing from exogenous sources operates to limit the divergence in conterit. The choice
of source countries for borrowing can produce perverse results: what
482. See A. Monir, supra n. 327, at 27.
483. On the law of wills, Egyptian Islamic law is also to be utilized for certain
substantive rules, though the procedural framework for probate is to be derived entirely from the common law.
484. See, e.g., the symposium on Islamic law in southeast Asia, [1985] Syariah L.J.
1-123; Bustani Arifin, "The Administration of Shariah Laws in Indonesia," [1984] Syariah L.J. 15; Mastura, "The Administration of Muslim Personal Laws in a MuslimMinority Country," [1984] Syariah L.J. 25. See also Ahmad Ibrahim, "The Shariah
Court and Its Place in the Judicial System," 5 Syariah L.J. 1,8-24 (1989) (discussing
Pakistani and Indonesian cases).
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looks familiar may turn out to be distant,485 and what looks distant
may turn out to be familiar.
There has been much academic discussion of the phenomenon of
legal pluralism (including dualism), albeit·in the face of some uncertainty about whether pluralism means the existence of two or more
legal systems operating in a single state or merely two contending
sets of norm:, with moral claims operating in a single environment. 486
In many ways, the Malaysian developments confirm and amplify
much of the discussion of the interpenetration of parallel sectors, the
imitation of one by the other, and the impulse to ultimate unification. 487 The Malaysian changes also suggest the fruitfulness of an
insight, inadequately developed in such discussions, regarding the
competition between sectors.488 Depending on the extent to which
jurisdiction :is overlapping, the courts of two systems in close proximity may actually compete for business by attempting to offer more
desirable procedures or rules of decision. This is not unknown where
secular and Islamic systems have had overlapping jurisdiction, as for
example in the lively competition for divorce cases between secular
and Islamic courts in coastal Kenya,489 and it was not uncommon in
England when ecclesiastical and common law courts were entertaining alternative actions. 49o Neglected by utilitarian theorists, this
competition can be an engine for change, even for a certain efficiency.
In one respect, however, discussion of legal pluralism has been
counterproductive. Law, it is said, "encodes ... asymmetrical power
relations,"491 and legal pluralism implies the inequality of the systems adjacent to each other.492 But to insist too strongly on this
point-to suggest "that the whole phenomenon is reducible to but another chapter in the history of oppression: who swindles whom,
when, where, and how"493-is to underestimate the capacity for
485. In South Africa, for example, in the first half of the twentieth century, when
Afrikaner jurists sought to purify their Roman-Dutch law of common law excrescences, they turned to the European continent, thinking it natural to refresh their
system from European roots; but the post-Napoleonic system may have had less affinity with the pre-code Roman-Dutch system than did the common law they were trying
to escape. See Baxter, "Pure Comparative Law and Legal Science in a Mixed Legal
System," 16 Compo & [nt'l L.J. So. Afr. 84, 95-96 (1983).
486. See, e.g., Bell, "A Perspective on Legal Pluralism in' 19th-Century New
Brunswick," 37 U. New Bruns. L.J. 86,88 (1988); von Benda-Beckmann, "Comment
on Merry," 22 L. & Soc'y Rev. 897,898 (1988).
487. See Griffiths, supra n. 479, at 8 (possibility of unification); Merry, "Legal Pluralism," 5 L. & Soc'y Rev. 869,877-81 (1988) (interpenetration and imitation).
488. Merry, supra n. 487, at 882.
489. See Susan F. Hirsch, Gender Differences in Disputing Strategies Among
Coastal Kenyan Muslims 12 (unpublished paper, Chicago, 1987) (women increasingly
choosing government courts).
490. Stone, supra n. 85, at 24-27.
491. Starr & Collier, supra n. 103, at 6.
492. Id. at 9; McKnight, supra n. 480, at 184.
493. Geertz, supra n. 37, at 220.
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changing the hierarchy of legal systems and especially to underestimate the paradoxical methods by which such changes are conceived
and brought to term. English law has been more prestigious in Malaysia, and it is precisely by burrowing into the system of English law
and appropriating its norms for the new Islamic project that the reformers have changed, among other things, the relative prestige of
the two systems.,

C. .Driving in Two Lanes: Legal Syncretism and Authenticity
All efforts to recover lost authenticity are inevitably futile, but
the direction of the fiction that is indulged along the way varies enormously. In many post-colonial societies, as nationalism broadened
out beyond the most acculturated elites, powerful movements arose
to recapture local languages, religions, and cultural practices. A conscious rejection of imported forms sent the proponents back, in Albert
Memmi's vivid formulation, "to frozen traditions, to a rusted
tongue. "494 In this revolt, the person escaping colonization "will
forego the use of the colonizer's language, even if all the locks of the
country turn with that' key; he will change the signs and highway
markings, even if he is the first to be inconvenienced."495 This forcible reconstruction of institutions is one path, but it is, as Memmi
notes, merely a phase. In law, especially, the resurrection of
precolonial institutions soon proves unsatisfying, for those who simultaneously want economic development, with its complex financial
transactions, or improved social conditions, with their concomitant
regulation of family life and interpersonal relations. And so, in law,
the quest for morally appropriate institutions eventually incorporates at least some of what is imported. All authenticity is fictive, but
the content of the fiction-the mix of the elements-is not a given.
Nor is the success of such a legal reform a foregone conclusion.
Sometimes the imported law simply cannot acquire a hold on legitimacy. Its legal requirements may be at odds with common patterns
of behavior, as imported family law is said to be in Thailand,496 or
they may be so threatening to social relations as to stir active resIstance and what amounts to counter-mobilization. 497 ,Yet it is abundantly clear that the success of a reform is not dependent on its
isomorphism with preexisting legal norms or its compatibility with'
specific features of the culture. The Malaysian reforms, to be sure,
avoided some wholesale conflicts with Malay culture by incorporating
494. Albert Memmi, The Colonizer and the Colonized 137 (1965).
495. Id.
496. See David M. Engel, Code and Custom in a Thai Provincial Court 171-78
(1978).
497. Massell, "Law as an Instrument of Revolutionary Change in a Traditional Milieu: The Case of Soviet Central Asia," 2 L. & Soc'y Rev. 179,201,205,217,222-27,
(1967).
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elements of adat, such as harta· sepencarian (though they transformed it as they incorporated it); but they also challenged what
Malays had become accustomed to, in taxation, divorce, payments to
rejected wives, and the doctrine of female recalcitrance, among other
things. By upgrading the kadis' courts and their procedure, they
made it certain that litigants and others who had contact with those
courts would be less comfortable with them and would not find them
"indigenous." None of this seems to have stirred significant rejection.
It may well be more important that a reform tap a powerful aspiration to modernity or find a home in an unusually adaptable culture,
whatever the particular practices of that culture. 498 The receptivity
to the reforms among the Malays may reside in their aspiration to be
simultaneously Muslim ·and up-to-date as well as in their history of
syncretism. Anyone who has driven on the roads of Malaysia has noticed the extent to which Malaysians do not observe lane discipline
but float flexibly on and across lane dividers, and many observers
have commented on the highly syncretic character of Malay culture,
including a considerable ability to live with contradiction. If Islamic
law in Malaysia is a capacious system, far from p·rimal absolutes and
far from the stereotype of the Shariah as rigid, fixed, immutable, and
medieval, perhaps that is because the Malays have an unusual ability to drive in two lanes, to avoid making decisive choices between
two systems. Where tolerance for ambiguity is high, thete may be
more scope for directed change using eclectic sources of law ..
Generally, the ability to live with contradiction is a trait hospitable to legal change. No doubt it can conduce to the adoption of incompatible elements, carelessly pieced together in the legal fabric; But
the benefits seem greater. This sort of tolerance permits a legal system to avoid dogmatism and to reject institutions that might otherwise appeal on grounds of mere consistency. It is, in short, conducive
to wide-ranging choice of rules and institutions and to pragmatism.
In this flexibility there also lurks a deeper danger. As I have
mentioned, there has been discussion in Malaysia of centralizing Islamic law, of synthesizing it with English law to produce B; new, overarching Malaysian common law, ultimately removing un-Islamic
features from statutes, and then, perhaps, breaking down the barrier
between the secular law and the Islamic law altogether. Something
like this is the common dream of all who are uncomfortable with dual
legal systems. So far it is merely a gleam in the eye of the unifiers.
The implication, however, is that even non-Muslims might be
subject to the newly unified law, although they have not participated
498. This is the argument of Nicholson, "Change Without Conflict: A Case Study of
Legal Change in Tanzania," 7 L. & Soc'y Rev. 747; 748-49, 760 (1973) (Sukuma were
adaptable and appreciative of modern institutions that displaced customary courts).
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in the recreation of the Islamic sector.499 One argument has it that if
non-Muslims can accept one foreign system, which they seem to prefer-namely, the English-derived system-why could they not accept
a system equally foreign to them but having Islamic features?
Law, remarks Geertz, prospers "if it c~n compass dis sensus
.••• "500 The test of Islamic law will be its long-term coexistence with
some version of the secular system, for the displacement of that system would disconcert non-Malays and religiously less observant
Malays as well. For good reason, legal pluralism is likely to endure
in many countries. 501 A large, if understandable, error of those who
drive in two lanes is to project equivalent adaptability onto others
and to assume that what has become, after a lengthy quest, authentic
and familiar, however eclectically it was created, can find easy and
unequivocal acceptance among people whose own search for authenticity may begin and end elsewhere.

499. But see Ahmad Ibrahim, supra n. 468, at 27-28. Professor Ahmad suggests a
much more limited possibility with respect to family law alone: ultimately, a uniform
statute for all Malaysians, given the convergence of Islamic and secular norms in this
field, but enforced in separate Islamic and secular courts. Presumably, the divorce
provisions would rest entirely on irretrievable breakdown, rather than khul', taflik,
or even fasakh. If irretrievable breakdown functioned effectively for men and women,
the other grounds would be largely redundant.
500. Geertz, supra n. 37, at 219.
501. Id. at 220.

